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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OR LEGAL FICTION?
NOTED EXCEPTIONS RECOGNIZED BY THE TENTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
Under the Fourth Amendment,' a search occurs when the govern-
ment seeks to intrude into an area in which a person has manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy that is recognized by society as being
reasonable.2 In authorizing the government to conduct a search, the Su-
preme Court has noted a strong preference for the issuance of warrants.3
"Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions."'4 Yet, if one were to look across the landscape of
Fourth Amendment law, this statement from the country's highest court
would seem to be fatally flawed.' For as Justice Scalia observed in Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo,6 the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement has be-
come "so riddled with exceptions that it [i]s basically unrecognizable."7
However, as stretched and maligned as the Fourth Amendment may be,8
it is the one protection that we, as citizens, have against governmental
intrusion into what we "seek[] to preserve as private."9
This survey addresses cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit from September 2000 to August 2001,
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
3. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.1, at 396 (3d ed. 1996).
4. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
5. See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 512 (1991)("Over about the last twenty years, the warrant has
evolved from being an absolute prerequisite of police intrusions upon persons and their possessions
and to the use of the fruits of any search or arrest, to a procedural requirement sometimes
acknowledged and rarely enforced." (internal citations omitted)).
6. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
7. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. See id. (noting that one commentator had catalogued some twenty exceptions to the
warrant requirement, including: "searches incident to arrest ... automobile searches . . .border
searches... administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent circumstances ... search[es]
incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause .. .boat boarding for document checks ...
welfare searches .. .inventory searches .. .airport searches .. .school search[es] .... (quoting
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74
(1985))).
9. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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which deal with exceptions the Tenth Circuit has recognized in allowing
searches to take place without a search warrant based on probable cause.
Part I analyzes the validity of consensual searches when they are pre-
ceded by a Fourth Amendment violation. Part II discusses the ability of
law enforcement officials to execute searches of homes based on arrest
warrants. Part III addresses administrative searches related to a regulated
industry, specifically, motor carriers. Finally, Part IV focuses on the
ability of secondary schools to conduct suspicionless searches of stu-
dents.
I. CONSENSUAL SEARCHES PRECEDED BY FOURTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS
A. Background
One of the most well-established and utilized exceptions to the war-
rant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is a
search based on the individual's consent.'0 There are several reasons for
this occurrence, including: administrative convenience of the police," the
ability of the police to search when there is no probable cause,'2 and the
perception of the individual to be searched that consenting will allow
him to clear his name and get about his business.' 3 In some cases, consent
to search is even sufficient to overcome a preceding illegal search or
seizure conducted by the police.' 4 While "evidence derived from the ex-
ploitation of an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed" as "fruit of
the poisonous tree,"'" if the government can establish that "the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come at... by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint,"' 16 it can "refute
the inference that the evidence was a product of the constitutional viola-
tion."'7
In a case that presents a valid search or seizure by the police, and
thus no initial Fourth Amendment violation, courts will review the "to-
tality of the circumstances" to determine whether the subsequent consent
was voluntary, and not "the product of duress or coercion."'" However,
10. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
11. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 596.
12. Id. at 597.
13. See id.
14. See United States v. McGill, 125 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997)(concluding consensual
search of vehicle proceeding illegal search was valid); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1164
(8th Cir. 1994) (concluding consensual search of vehicle following illegal stop was valid); United
States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1013 (10th Cir. 1992)(concluding consensual search of
home following warrantless entry was valid).
15. United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998).
16. United States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471,488 (1963)).
17. Miller, 146 F.3d at 279.
18. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
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when the initial search or seizure violates the Constitution, the burden on
the government is heightened,' 9 and the government must demonstrate
that the consent was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful invasion."20 The Tenth Circuit has held that the fac-
tors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois,2' are espe-
cially important in determining if consent preceding a Fourth Amend-
ment violation is "sufficiently voluntary to purge the primary taint" of
the illegal search or seizure. "Among the factors which warrant consid-
eration are '[t]he temporal proximity of the [Fourth Amendment viola-
tion] and the [consent], the presence of intervening circumstances, and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."' 23 In
United States v. Caro,24 the Tenth Circuit reviewed the admissibility of
evidence discovered during a consensual search of a vehicle based on a
stop that was unconstitutional in its scope.25
B. United States v. Caro
1. Facts
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery pulled over Caro after
he noticed that the windows of the car Caro was driving appeared to be
darker than the law of Utah permitted.26 After Trooper Avery asked Caro
for his license and registration, he noticed that the license was from Iowa
and in Caro's name, while the registration was from Nebraska and in
another person's namef 7 Caro appeared shaky and nervous, and told
Trooper Avery that the car belonged to his friend, but was unable to re-
call his friend's last name.28 A subsequent check revealed that the license
was valid and that the car was not stolen; however, the car color was
different than the color listed on the registration.29 Caro's nervous be-
havior, his inability to remember the car owner's name, and the color
discrepancy led Trooper Avery to suspect that the car was stolen.
Trooper Avery next sought to compare the Vehicle Identification
Number ("VIN") listed on the registration to the VIN plate visible
through the windshield on the car's dashboard.3' After Trooper Avery
determined that the two matched, he asked Caro if he would exit the ve-
19. Miller, 146 F.3d at 279.
20. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486.
21. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
22. United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992).
23. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1011 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04).
24. 248 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001).
25. Caro, 248 F.3d at 1248.





31. Caro, 248 F.3d at 1243.
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hicle so that he could also compare the VIN on the driver's door.3 2 Caro
complied, but Trooper Avery was unable to find a VIN on the driver's
door.33 However, while searching for the VIN plate on the door, Trooper
Avery noticed air fresheners hanging in the car, as well as a bottle of air
freshener.34 This discovery made Trooper Avery suspicious that drugs
might be in the car, which led him to ask Caro if any drugs were
present.35 After Caro responded in the negative, Trooper Avery asked for
Caro's consent to search the car, which was subsequently given.36
Trooper Avery did not return Caro's license and registration until
Caro opened both the trunk and hood of the car.37 After an inspection of
the trunk, Trooper Avery looked under the hood of the car.3s Trooper
Avery noticed that the battery appeared oversized, and upon further in-
spection, found two packages containing methamphetamine.39
The district court denied Caro's motion to suppress the drug evi-
dence. 40 The court stated, "from the totality of the evidence presented...
the investigative detention which occurred after the stop was supported
by an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity."'', Furthermore,
the court held that Caro had voluntarily consented to the search of the
42
car.
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
The first issue the Tenth Circuit addressed was whether "Trooper
Avery exceeded the lawful scope of detention."" The court noted that
based on the suspicious circumstances presented, including the discrep-
ancy in the car's registered color and Caro's inability to identify the
owner's name, Trooper Avery had reasonable suspicion which justified
further questioning after the initial stop for the traffic violation.44 How-
ever, the court stated:
[W]here the dashboard VIN plate is readable from outside the pas-
senger compartment, that VIN matches the VIN listed on the regis-
tration, and there are no signs the plate has been tampered with, there
is insufficient cause for an officer to extend the scope of a detention
32. Id. at 1242-43.








41. Id. (quoting district court memorandum decision and order).
42. Id.
43. Caro, 248 F.3d at 1244.
44. Id. at 1246.
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by entering a vehicle's passenger compartment for the purpose of
further examining any VIN.45
Thus, the court held that "Trooper Avery's actions exceeded the permis-
sible scope of the detention and violated Mr. Caro's Fourth Amendment
rights."4
The next issue the Tenth Circuit considered was "whether the search
[for an additional VIN] was nevertheless justified by Mr. Caro's con-
sent."4'7 The court stated that, "a search that is preceded by a Fourth
Amendment violation may still be valid if the defendant's consent to that
search 'was voluntary in fact under the totality of the circumstances.'
4 8
The government must be able to show that there was "a sufficient at-
tenuation or 'break in the causal connection between the illegal detention
and the consent."' 4 9 The court relied on factors pronounced by the Su-
preme Court in Brown as guidance in determining whether Caro's con-
sent to search was capable of purging the taint of the impermissible
stop5 0 Specifically, the court considered: 1) the lapse of time between
Caro's illegal seizure and his consent; 2) whether there were any inter-
vening circumstances; and 3) whether Trooper Avery's conduct was de-
liberate or flagrant.5"
The Tenth Circuit held that based on the totality of the circum-
stances, Caro's consent to the search for an additional VIN was "insuffi-
cient to purge the taint of his unlawful detention. 5 2 First, there was no
attenuation because when Trooper Avery asked for Caro's consent, he
still possessed Caro's license and registration, as well as a warning cita-
tion for illegal tint.53 Furthermore, Trooper Avery failed to instruct Caro
that he could leave the scene or refuse consent. 54 Second, the Brown fac-
tors demonstrated that Caro's consent was not voluntary." No time
elapsed between Caro's illegal seizure and consent, no intervening cir-
cumstances were present, and Trooper Avery's conduct was deliberate,
since he knew when he asked for consent that the dashboard VIN
matched the VIN on the registration.56 Accordingly, the court ruled that
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1247.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1994)).




52. Id. at 1248.
53. Id. at 1247.
54. Id.
55. Caro, 248 F.3d at 1247.
56. Id. at 1247-48.
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any evidence derived from Trooper Avery's search for an additional VIN
must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree.""
The final issue the Tenth Circuit addressed was whether the general
search of Caro's vehicle, based on the discovery of the air fresheners
during the search for an additional VIN, was justified by consent5 8 The
court stated that the air fresheners discovered by Trooper Avery could
not "provide a valid foundation for enlarged suspicion, as they were
'come at by the exploitation of [the] illegality."' '59 In addition, the court
believed that the same Brown factors that tainted the initial search for the
VIN were "still present and unmitigated" when Caro consented to the




The Eight Circuit achieved a different outcome in United States v.
McGill,62 In McGill, Officer Parker was summoned to the scene of an
63accident in which McGill was involved. As part of the investigation,
Officer Parker required the VIN numbers of the vehicles involved in the
accident.64 In order to view the VIN number of McGill's truck, Officer
Parker stuck his head through the driver's side window, even though the
VIN number was visible through the windshield.65 In doing so, Officer
Parker was confronted with the smell of marijuana from inside McGill's
truck.' Upon relaying his discovery to McGill, Officer Parker asked for
consent to search the truck, which was subsequently given.' A search of
the truck uncovered "marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray and baggies of
marijuana behind a loose dashboard panel plate." ' Officer Parker ar-
rested McGill, and a subsequent search of the truck at the police station
revealed the presence of a firearm, from which the federal charges impli-
cated in this case arose.'
At the trial level, McGill filed a motion to suppress the firearm,
arguing that the Fourth Amendment was violated when Officer Parker
stuck his head into McGill's truck to read the VIN, and that the gun was
57. Id. at 1248.
58. See id.
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996)).
60. Id.
61. Caro, 248 F.3d at 1248.
62. 125 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997).






69. McGill, 125 F.3d at 643.
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the fruit of an illegal search.' The district court denied McGill's motion
to suppress, finding that the "marijuana was inevitably discoverable.'
The court stated that Officer Parker would have eventually either smelled
the marijuana emanating from the truck or have checked the VIN number
on the inside of the driver's door.72
On appeal, the Eight Circuit affirmed.73 Without addressing the le-
gality of the initial search,74 the court noted that, "McGill's voluntary
consent was sufficiently an act of free will, even if Parker's motive in
requesting consent was supplied by an unlawful prior search. 75 In mak-
ing its determination, the court relied on the factors outlined in Brown.6
The court recognized that Officer Parker's request for consent took place
immediately following the purported unlawful search, absent any inter-
vening circumstances.77 However, the court noted that McGill was aware
of his right to refuse consent.78 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
the most important factor, "the nature of Officer Parker's Fourth
Amendment violation," demonstrated that Officer Parker was acting ap-
propriately in response to an automobile accident that was caused by
McGill.79 Accordingly, the circumstances demonstrated that McGill's
consent was sufficient to purge the taint of the assumed illegal search by
Officer Parker.'
D. Analysis
Consensual searches are the most commonly used weapon within the
arsenal of law enforcement.8 1 Police conducting these searches do not
have to make the same outside efforts that are required by the warrant
system, 82 and people are often willing to allow the police to conduct a
search in order to avoid the hassle of a prolonged seizure.83 However, the
rule that the Tenth Circuit enunciated in Caro permits evidence that
would normally be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree to be
cleansed of its unconstitutional taint, if the consent was voluntary in fact
70. See id. at 644.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 645.
74. Id, at 644.
75. McGill, 125 F.3d at 645 (internal quotations omitted).
76. See id. at 644.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 644 ("Ascertaining the vehicle's VIN number and determining whether McGill's
driving had been impaired by drugs or alcohol were highly relevant to th[e] investigation.").
80. Id. at 645.
81. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 596; see also MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F.
WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 212 (1998)("In most jurisdictions, the police conduct far more
consensual searches than those justified by probable cause or a search warrant.").
82. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 596.
83. See id. at 597.
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and not the product of an illegal search or seizure. 8 This rule goes one
step further because consent can not only overcome the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but can also
brush aside the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine that is imbedded in
our jurisprudence.
II. SEARCHES OF HOMES PURSUANT TO AN ARREST WARRANT
A. Background
In Payton v. New York, 5 the Supreme Court adopted the stance that
while a "man's house is his castle, 86 it is "constitutionally reasonable to
require him to open his doors to the officers of the law., 87 This decision
allowed law enforcement officers to gain constitutional admittance to
people's homes based on an arrest warrant founded on probable cause
and a reasonable belief the person was home.8 However, on the trail of
this case was Steagald v. United States,s9 which the Supreme Court de-
cided a year later. Steagald sought to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of innocent individuals from governmental intrusion by limiting
the ability of law enforcement officers to search houses based on an ar-
rest warrant for a third party guest.90 However, as United States v. Gay9'
demonstrates, the Tenth Circuit has interwoven the rationales of the two
tests92 and one must now question who is a third party guest, and when is
a resident susceptible to police intrusion.
B. United States v. Gay
1. Facts
Gay was arrested for "possession of cocaine base with intent to dis-
tribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)." 93 While out on bail, Gay
fled, and the United States Marshal Service tried for two years to serve a
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) arrest warrant on Gay.'
Subsequently, Deputy McNeil of the United States Marshal Service
received information from an informant regarding the whereabouts of
Gay, who was supposedly living with his uncle at the time. 95 Officers
84. See United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001).
85. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
86. Payton, 445 U.S. at 596.
87. Id. at 602-03.
88. Id. at 603.
89. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
90. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205-06.
91. 240 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2571 (2001).
92. See Gay, 240 F.3d at 1226.
93. Id. at 1224.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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obtained and executed a search warrant for the uncle's residence, but
Gay was not present.96 However, an informant at the residence stated that
Gay did not live at his uncle's residence. 97 Instead, the informant knew
from "personal experience and numerous visits" that Gay lived at a dif-
ferent location two miles away. 98 The informant escorted the law en-
forcement officers to the location of Gay's duplex, which he pointed out,
and told them Gay was presently inside.99
After arriving at the new residence, Deputy McNeil, accompanied
by other officers, knocked on the door and announced "police."' ° After
hearing a "thud" and waiting a few seconds, the police forcibly entered
the residence and found Gay.'0 ' At Gay's feet was a gun and in plain
view was crack cocaine. '02 Gay was arrested and admitted to owning the
gun and drugs.' 3 The district court denied Gay's motion to suppress and
Gay subsequently pled guilty to drug and firearm charges."'
4
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
Gay argued that in order for the officers to have lawfully arrested
him at the second residence, a search warrant was required.' 5 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed.'" The court noted that under Steagald, when the home
to be searched involves a third party, a search warrant is required "absent
exigent circumstances or consent. ' °7 However, when there is "a reason-
able belief the arrestee (1) live[s] in the residence; and (2) is within the
residence at the time of entry," a Payton analysis is required and an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause is sufficient.'0 In light of the circum-
stances presented, the court believed the Payton test was applicable.' °
First, the Tenth Circuit considered whether it was reasonable for the
officers to believe Gay lived at the second residence when the search was
conducted."0 The court noted that the officers' belief that the suspect
lived in the residence was based on an objective standard, and "need not
prove true in fact.""' Furthermore, the suspect need not actually live in
the residence, "so long as he 'possesses common authority over, or some
96. Id. at 1224-25.
97. Id. at 1225.






104. Gay, 240 F.3d at 1225.
105. Id. at 1226.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981)).
108. Id. (citing Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999)).
109. Id.
110. See Gay, 240 F.3d at 1226-27.
111. Id. at 1226 (quoting Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225).
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other significant relationship to, the residence entered by police."' 2 This
is because "people do not live in individual, separate, hermetically-sealed
residences[, but] live with other people[;] they move from one residence
to another."" 3 Based on the detailed information provided by the infor-
mant, the court held that the belief that Gay lived at the second residence
was objectively reasonable."
4
Second, the Tenth Circuit considered whether it was reasonable for
the officers to believe Gay was inside the residence at the time of the
search."5 The court noted that the officers need not actually see the sus-
pect because criminals often attempt to evade detection." 6 Based upon
the knowledge of the informant and the fact that he "explicitly told the
officers Mr. Gay was currently in his home," as well as the "thud" which
was heard after knocking on the door," 7 the court held it was reasonable
to believe Gay was present at the second residence when the search took
place. " 8
Accordingly, after considering the "totality of the circumstances,"
the court held that the officers' beliefs were reasonable and that the
search of the second residence was authorized by the arrest warrant.
' 9
C. Other Circuits
In Watts v. County of Sacramento,'20 plaintiff Christopher Pryor and
his girlfriend Binti Watts brought a civil action claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 after police officers mistakenly entered their home trying
to execute an arrest warrant. 2 ' The police had received an anonymous tip
informing them that Chris Burgess, a wanted murder suspect, had been
seen in front of the plaintiffs' house.'22 Acting on the tip, the police as-
sembled on Watts' house to execute an arrest warrant already issued for
Burgess on charges of murder and assault.2 3 After Pryor opened the door,
the police recognized that he fit the general description, as well as an-
swered to the name Chris.'24 Pryor was handcuffed and Watts and her
children were placed under guard, until the police discovered that they
had seized the wrong person. 25 The district court granted defendants'
112. Id. (quoting Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225).
113. Id. at 1226-27(quoting Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225).
114. Id. at 1227.
115. See id. at 1227-28.
116. Gay, 240 F.3d at 1227 (citing Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1226).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1228.
119. Id.
120. 256 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2001).
121. Watts, 256 F.3d at 887.
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motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful entry
claim.
2 6
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
127
The court stated that in order for a search based on an arrest warrant to
be valid against "a co-resident of the third party ..... [the] officer must
have a reasonable belief that the suspect named in the arrest warrant re-
sides in the third party's home and that he is actually present at the time
of entry into the home.', 2' Based on the facts of the case, the court held
that the police officers could not have established a reasonable belief that
Pryor lived at the residence. 29
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit has transformed the rationale behind Payton and
Steagald with its adoption of an objective, reasonableness standard to
coincide with the Payton test. Payton and Steagald set up a simple line,
if it's your house and the police have a valid arrest warrant, the govern-
ment's interests in safety and crime reduction take priority over the ar-
restee's privacy rights.'3' However, when the subject of the arrest warrant
is at the home of a third party, then the innocent third party's interests
triumph over the government's."3 By employing the standard that was
used in Gay, whereby the court looks to see if the police possessed a
"reasonable belief [that] the arrestee lived in the residence,"'33 the pro-
tection that was once afforded the innocent third party is jeopardized.
While this is not a new take for the Tenth Circuit, " it seems to bear re-
semblance to a general warrant,'35 allowing law enforcement officials to
search wherever a person may decide to frequent based solely on an ar-
rest warrant. Accordingly, while the Tenth Circuit has stated that the
"warrantless entry of the home is the 'chief evil against which . . . the
126. Id. at 888-89.
127. Watts, 256 F.3d at 891.
128. Id. at 889-890 (citing United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1996); Perez v.
Simmons, 900 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1990)).
129. Id. at 890.
130. See United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
131. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
132. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1981).
133. Gay, 240 F.3d at 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
134. See, e.g., Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220. 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1999). The court
stated:
[E]ntry into a residence pursuant to an arrest warrant is permitted when "the facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the
totality. ... warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect's
dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry."
Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1225-26 (quoting United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.
1995)).
135. "[A] general warrant ... authorize[s] the agent to search private premises, without
specifying the place to search or the things to seize." MILLER & WRIGHT. supra note 81, at 136.
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Fourth Amendment is directed," '36 its actions demonstrate that the court
does not hold this belief inviolate if the government is allowed to gain
admittance based on a minimal showing under the reasonable belief
standard.
III. SEARCHES OF CLOSELY REGULATED INDUSTRY
A. Background
In New York v. Burger,'37 the Supreme Court enunciated that busi-
ness owners who take part in a "closely regulated" industry have an at-
tenuated expectation of privacy, such that warrantless searches are justi-
fiable. 38 The Court recognized that if the government has a substantial
interest in regulating an industry, the inspections further the goal of the
regulation, and a statute gives notice of the inspections and limits discre-
tion, the Fourth Amendment would not be discredited. 39 In United States
v. Vasquez-Castillo,'° the Tenth Circuit utilized the Burger test to decide
whether warrantless searches of commercial carriers in New Mexico
were constitutionally permissible.
4
B. United States v. Vasquez-Castillo
1. Facts
Pursuant to New Mexico law, 42 "all commercial carriers entering or
leaving New Mexico . . ." are required to stop at ports of entry for in-
spection "to determine whether the vehicles, drivers, and cargo are in
compliance with state laws regarding public safety, health, and
welfare.' 4 3 If commercial carriers have a "Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance" (CVSA) inspection sticker, they typically only undergo a brief
inspection; however, if the commercial carrier does not have an inspec-
tion sticker, then the inspection will be more thorough.' 44 While passing
through the port of entry, Vasquez-Castillo's truck was directed to un-
dergo the most thorough inspection, based upon several factors, includ-
ing the lack of an inspection decal, non-current logbook, and irregulari-
ties regarding the bill of lading.'
5
136. United States v. Lowe, 999 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
137. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
138. Burger, 482 U.S. at 691.
139. Id. at 702-03.
140. 258 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).
141. See Vasquez- Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1210-12.
142. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-5-1 (2001).
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After the outside of the truck and trailer were inspected, the In-
spector, Pacheco, decided to inspect the "blocking and bracing," to make
sure the cargo was secured and did not shift while in transit.'4 Upon en-
tering the trailer, Inspector Pacheco perceived the amount of cargo
Vasquez-Castillo was carrying to be unusually small in relation to the
truck size.4 7 As he moved further into the trailer, Inspector Pacheco
smelled raw marijuana.' Inspector Pacheco also noticed a space "be-
tween the inner wall and outer hull of the trailer," footprints on the trailer
wall, and an "air vent in the trailer that appeared to lead to nowhere."'
49
After asking Vasquez-Castillo for consent to search behind the wall, and
having Vasquez-Castillo sign a consent form, Inspector Pacheco opened
the wall and found "over 800 pounds of marijuana concealed in the com-
partment."' Vasquez-Castillo was subsequently arrested and his motion
to suppress the evidence was denied by the district court.'5'
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied the three-prong test annunciated in Bur-
ger to determine "whether a warrantless inspection of a closely regulated
industry violates the Fourth Amendment.' ' 2 Specifically, the test re-
quired the following:
First, there must be a substantial government interest that in-
forms the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is
made. Second, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to fur-
ther the regulatory scheme .... Finally, the statute's inspection pro-
gram, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must
provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
53
The court determined the first prong was satisfied because New
Mexico has a substantial interest in promoting safety on its highways.'
4
The court also determined that the warrantless inspection was necessary
to further the regulatory scheme because commercial carriers traveling
on the highway move quickly in and out of the State's jurisdiction.55
Therefore, the second prong was also met.
The third prong, requiring the inspection program to be an "ade-
quate substitute for a warrant," provided the court with the most in-depth
analysis.'5 6 The court noted that in order to satisfy the third prong, the
146. Id. at 1209 n.2.
147. Id. at 1209.
148. Id.
149. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1209-10.
150. Id. at 1210.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987)).
154. Id. at 1211.
155. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1211.
156. Id.
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New Mexico regulation must inform commercial carriers that their trucks
are susceptible to inspections for specific purposes, must inform them
who may undertake the inspections, and must limit the inspectors' dis-
cretion "in time, place, and scope.' 57 The court determined the regulation
satisfied this third prong, and that Vasquez-Castillo "could not help but
be aware that his property was subject to periodic inspections undertaken
for specific purposes, including inspection of the blocking and
bracing."'" 8
Because the New Mexico regulatory statute satisfied all three
prongs, the court held that Inspector Pacheco was authorized to be within
the trailer prior to his detection of the marijuana smell.'59
The court next considered whether Inspector Pacheco had probable
cause to search between the walls of the trailer." Based on the "totality
of the circumstances," including the smell of marijuana, the, internal ir-
regularities in the trailer, and the irregularities found by Inspector
Pacheco concerning the bill of lading and log book, the court held that
Inspector Pacheco had probable cause to search between the walls and
that the search did not violate Vasquez-Castillo's Fourth Amendment
constitutional rights.' 6' In doing so, the court relied on the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, which allows for the search of an




In United States v. Fort,'63 the Fifth Circuit, in a case of first impres-
sion, adopted the stance that commercial trucking is a closely regulated
industry and falls within the warrant exception annunciated by the Court
in Burger.'6' In Fort, the defendant's commercial truck was randomly
stopped and inspected, and a cargo of 561.2 pounds of marijuana was
discovered.'65 The court concluded that the stop and search were permit-
ted because the regulatory program satisfied the three Burger require-
ments.' 66 Specifically, the court noted that: 1) Texas had an interest in
protecting travelers on its roads and reducing the costs incurred by tax-
payers from injuries caused by commercial vehicles;' 6' 2) "warrantless
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1212 (quoting United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1212-13.
161. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1213.
162. See id. at 1212.
163. 248 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001).
164. Fort, 248 F.3d at 480.
165. Id. at 477-78.
166. Id. at 480-82.
167. Id. at 480.
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stops and inspections are necessary" to promote highway safety and be-
cause "commercial trucks pass quickly through states and .. jurisdic-
tions of the enforcement agencies;"' and 3) the Texas statute provided
commercial carriers with notice that their vehicles were susceptible to
search and seizure, and limited the discretion of the officers conducting
the inspections.' 69
D. Analysis
In Vasquez-Castillo, the Tenth Circuit sought to apply the closely
regulated industry exception outlined by the Supreme Court in Burger to
motor carriers. 7 Unlike most exceptions the Tenth Circuit has recog-
nized, this exception, while balancing the interests of the individual and
the government, also contains a check to act as a warrant substitute.'
Specifically, the State or agency must set up a regulation to serve as no-
tice to those who might be affected by its actions, while at the same time
limiting the scope of its own discretionary actions.72 As such, while other
exceptions might involve a reasonableness inquiry based solely on the
perceptions of individuals, the Burger test is more codified and struc-
tured.
IV. SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES IN SCHOOLS
A. Background
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 73 the Supreme Court held
that suspicionless searches of school children may be reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment if the government's interests in a school policy
outweigh the students' privacy interests which are compromised by the
policy.' 74 The Supreme Court noted that a "search unsupported by prob-
able cause can be constitutional . . . 'when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable. '"1 75 According to the Supreme Court, the
public school forum qualified for the "special needs" exception to the
warrant requirement because the warrant requirement would interfere
with the ability of schools to maintain order and discipline.'76 In a case of
first impression, the Tenth Circuit, in Earls ex rel Earls v. Board of Edu-
168. Id. at 481.
169. Id. at 482.
170. See United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1210-12 (10th Cir. 2001).
171. See Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1211.
172. Id.
173. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
174. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 646.
175. Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
176. Id.
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cation,'77 sought to apply the reasoning of the Vernonia Court to a drug-
testing program administered by an Oklahoma high school.'78
B. Earls ex rel Earls v. Board of Education
1. Facts
Students of Tecumseh High School in Oklahoma brought a civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Board of Education and
the School District.'79 The students sought to challenge "the constitution-
ality of the random suspicionless urinalysis drug testing policy which the
District implemented for all students participating in competitive extra-
curricular activities.""'8 The testing policy adopted by the School District
required every student who wished to participate in extracurricular ac-
tivities to "sign a written consent agreeing to submit to drug testing prior
to participating in the activity, randomly during the year while partici-
pating, and at any time while participating upon reasonable suspicion."' 8 '
The testing itself was done based on a strict procedure and the informa-
tion was kept confidential. 2 The testing results were only disclosed to
specific school personnel who "ha[d] a need to know," and never to "any
law enforcement authorities."'83 If a student did not wish to be drug
tested, he/she could not participate in the school's extracurricular activi-
ties. '8 At the trial level, the district court held that the drug testing policy
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'85
2. Tenth Circuit Decision
In considering whether the suspicionless drug testing policy adopted
by the School District violated the Fourth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit
was required to determine if the policy fell within the "special needs"
doctrine.'86 "[U]nder the special needs doctrine, the [c]ourt identifies a
special need which makes impracticable adherence to the warrant and
probable cause requirements, then balances the government's interest in
conducting the particular search against the individual's privacy interests
upon which the search intrudes.' 87 The court noted that the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment would interfere
177. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
178. See Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1264, 1270-78.
179. Id. at 1266.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1267.
182. Id. at 1267-68.
183. Id. at 1268.
184. Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268.
185. Id. at 1266.
186. Id. at 1269.
187. Id.
[Vol. 79:3
2002] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT 347
with the disciplinary needs of the School District and their ability to
maintain order.'8
The court next sought to determine the reasonableness of the search
based on a balancing test of the interests of the parties involved.'89 The
first factor the court considered was the "nature of the privacy interest
upon which the search .. .intrudes."' 9° The court initially noted that a
student's expectation of privacy should not be diminished just because
they voluntarily choose to participate in an activity; however, the court
went on to reason that because students are required to follow rules in
order to participate in extracurricular activities, either from a coach or
teacher, their personal freedom is constrained to some degree.' 9' Thus,
participants in extracurricular activities expect less privacy than those
students who choose not to participate.' 92
The second factor considered was "the character of the intrusion
that is complained of."' 93 The court determined the invasion of privacy to
the student was minimal based on the manner in which the testing took
place, the information obtained, and how the information was used.'
94
The final factor the Tenth Circuit considered was "the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of
this means for meeting it."' ' The court noted that the safety concerns
raised by the School District were lacking because the policy "too often
simply tests the wrong students."' 96 For instance, the court stated that
students who participate in choir are tested out of concern for injury, but
students who participate in shop or school labs, where an injury is more
perceivable, are not required to submit to the testing. 97 Furthermore, the
court recognized that there did not even appear to be a "measurable drug
problem" in the School District, which diminished the efficacy of the
drug testing greatly.' 8 The court stated, that "[s]pecial needs must rest on
demonstrated realities." '99 For if a school district did not have to demon-
strate a perceivable problem before acting, their ability to invade upon
the rights of the students would be limitless.''
188. Id. at 1270.
189. Id.
190. Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 654 (1995)).
191. Id. at 1276.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 658).
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 660).
196. Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1278 (quoting United Teachers v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 857 (5th
Cir. 1998)).
200. Id.
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Accordingly, based on a balancing of the three major interests con-
cerned, the court concluded that the drug testing policy adopted by the
School District was unconstitutional and violated the students' Fourth
201Amendment protections.
C. Other Circuits
The Eleventh Circuit also employed the analysis presented by the
Supreme Court in Vernonia, in determining whether suspicionless
searches of school children were constitutional in light of the Fourth
Amendment. 202 In Thomas ex rel Thomas v. Roberts, a fifth grade teacher
and a police officer, on campus to do a drug prevention demonstration,
conducted strip searches of students after one student's school trip
money disappeared in class.23 The students affected filed suit claiming
they had been deprived of their constitutional rights, including a Fourth
Amendment claim.2°4 Although ruling that the strip searches were uncon-
stitutional, the district court held that the individual defendants were
shielded by qualified immunity.05
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a "search may be con-
ducted without individualized suspicion when 'the privacy interests im-
plicated by the search are minimal, and ... an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a re-
quirement of individualized suspicion. ' '' 20 Applying this test to the facts
of the case, the court concluded that the theft of the student's money did
not present a threat to the discipline or safety of the school such that stu-
dents could be strip searched without individualized suspicion.0 7 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the searches were unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment.
208
A different result was reached by the Seventh Circuit in Joy v.
Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation. °9 In Joy, students brought
suit against Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation ("PHM"), chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a policy that provided for "random, sus-
picionless drug testing of students involved in extracurricular activities
and of students driving to school.,,2'0 The policy sought to test for "drugs,
alcohol, and tobacco,' and required students who participated in extra-
201. Id.
202. See Thomas ex rel Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1167-69 (11 th Cir. 2001).
203. See Thomas ex rel Thomas, 261 F.3d at 1163-64.
204. Id. at 1165.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1167 (quoting'Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)).
207. Id. at 1169.
208. Id.
209. 212 F.3d 1052, 1067 (7th Cir. 2000).
210. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1054.
211. Id.
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curricular activities or who received a parking permit to sign a consent
form agreeing to be tested. 2 The policy outlined a strict procedure for
the testing, and provided for confidentiality of the results.2 '3 Furthermore,
a student "receiving a positive test result, [could] be subject to exclusion
from any extracurricular activities and/or to revocation of parking privi-
leges."24 At the trial level, the district court upheld the testing of both
students involved in extracurricular activities and those who drove to
school.25
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that it had addressed the issue
of student drug testing in Todd v. Rush County Schools,2 6 in which it
upheld suspicionless testing of students for drugs, alcohol, and nicotine
2' 7
without reviewing the factors enunciated in Vernonia.2 8 Notwithstanding
its decision in Todd, the court stated that if "we were reviewing this case
based solely on Vernonia and Chandler, we would not sustain the ran-
dom drug, alcohol, and nicotine testing of students seeking to participate
in extracurricular activities.",2'9 The court subsequently undertook an
analysis of PHM's testing policy based on the factors enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Vernonia.220
First, the court noted that the "expectation of privacy for students in
extracurricular activities... [was] greater than the expectation of privacy
for athletes, 22' which the Supreme Court assessed in Vernonia. Second,
the court stated that the "character of the intrusion [wa]s not overly inva-
,222sive." Third, the court noted that PHM failed to demonstrate any con-
nection between students involved in extracurricular activities and drug
use, nor did it "explain[] how drug use affects students in extracurricular
activities differently than students in general., 223 Fourth, the court noted
that there was no indication that testing students involved in extracur-
ricular activities would address the problem.224 Furthermore, PHM failed
to demonstrate how requiring individualized suspicion would be unfeasi-
ble.225 Thus, based on the Vernonia factors, the court believed that the
226PHM testing policy was unconstitutional. However, applying the doc-
212. Id. at 1055.
213. See id. at 1057.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).
217. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1061 (citing Todd, 133 F.3d at 986-87).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1063.
220. See id. at 1063-65.
221. Id. at 603.
222. Id. at 1064.
223. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1064.
224. Id. at 1065.
225. See id. ("PHM has made no showing that teachers, staff and sponsors of extracurricular
activities would not be able to observe the students for suspicious behavior.").
226. Id.
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trine of stare decisis and its prior ruling in Todd, the court affirmed the
district court's decision permitting testing of students involved in extra-
curricular activities.227
In addressing the suspicionless testing of student drivers, the Sev-
enth Circuit reached a similar result, concluding that testing for drugs
and alcohol was reasonable, but withholding the ability to test for nico-
'221tine. In reaching this decision, however, the court relied on the analysis
outlined in Vernonia, instead of precedent.229 Specifically, the court rec-
ognized "a legitimate and pressing need for drug and alcohol testing of
students driving vehicles on school property, 230 because the risk imposed
was substantial in nature23' and requiring individualized suspicion was
not feasible.232 The need to test for nicotine, however, was unjustifiable
233
because there was no demonstrated risk and the policy could punish stu-
dents for legal behavior.M
D. Analysis
In deciding Earls, the Tenth Circuit was presented with a case of
first impression. 235 The court used the factors adopted by the Supreme
Court in Vernonia as guidance in determining if the drug testing policy
was reasonable by balancing the privacy interests of the high school stu-
dents involved and the governmental interests in effectuating the
policy. 236 Unlike the Supreme Court in Vernonia, however, the Tenth
Circuit was faced with a negligible drug problem at Tecumseh High
School 137 and was unwilling to allow suspicionless drug testing of stu-
dents without a showing that the intrusion would redress the problem at
hand.238 While the Tenth Circuit was restrained in its unwillingness to
allow for searches based on such a non-demonstrable showing, the "spe-
cial needs" exception adopted to analyze the issue is but one more test
which centers on the reasonableness of the governmental policy and pays
little heed to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.
227. Id. at 1066.
228. Id. at 1065.
229. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1063-65.
230. Id. at 1064.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 1065.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1064.
235. See Earls ex rel Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2001).
236. See Earls ex rel Earls, 242 F.3d at 1275-78.
237. See id. at 1272-75.
238. Id. at 1278 ("Unless a [school] district is required to demonstrate such a problem, there is
no limit on what students a school may randomly and without suspicion test. Without any limitation,
schools could test all of their students simply as a condition of attending school.").
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V. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit continued to adopt new
and broadening exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment. The Supreme Court, and the Tenth Circuit with it, "has shifted...
from a conjunctive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to an inter-
pretation that is increasingly disjunctive and, for searches unrelated to
criminal investigations, reliant upon the special needs balancing test to
determine reasonableness." '239 While the saying that the Fourth Amend-
ment has a preference for warrants might have once been true, the past
year does not mirror that sentiment in the Tenth Circuit. At this current
pace, the exceptions might soon swallow the warrant and probable cause
rule, leaving the private individual to the discretion of the police and
unable to rely on the impartiality and detachment of a neutral and in-
formed magistrate.
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